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1.  Introduction 
The cyclical behavior of prices has re-emerged as an important focus of research in 
macroeconomics.  The well-known failure of real business cycle models to fit price and wage 
data and the renewed interest in sticky-price models of monetary policy both highlight the 
importance of price adjustment.  A better understanding of price adjustment is necessary in 
order to base business cycle theory and policy analysis on sound microeconomic foundations. 
  In classical economic models, prices move in such a way as to stabilize 
production and employment: if demand increases, firms raise prices, and this reduces demand.  
But the link between demand and prices, which follows immediately from standard 
microeconomic theory, has been hard to find in the data.  Researchers who estimate 
conventional price equations typically find that prices do respond strongly and quickly to 
factor prices, but they are much less responsive to demand.
1  Bils and Chang (2000) confirm 
this result in a recent study.  Shea (1993) found that prices in most industries do rise with 
demand, but with a considerable lag.  Bils (1987) and Rotemberg-Woodford (1991, 1999) 
construct measures of marginal cost and conclude that the markup on marginal cost is 
strongly counter-cyclical.
2   
The cyclical pattern of the markup is important because a counter-cyclical 
markup will have a destabilizing effect on the economy, making the short-run supply curve 
flat and amplifying the effects of real demand disturbances.  Also, as emphasized by 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), if an increase in demand has a negative effect on the 
desired markup, the resulting “real price rigidity” will amplify the effects of nominal frictions.  
Understanding real price rigidity is important in order to understand nominal price rigidity.
 3 
The puzzling behavior of prices suggests that some important elements are 
missing in the textbook treatment of price determination.  To understand price adjustment, we 
need to find these missing elements and develop richer and more realistic models of price 
dynamics.  In this paper we argue that long-term customer relations, financial constraints, and 
                                                                 
1 For references to older literature, see e. g. Gottfries (1991) and Bils and Chang (2000 ). 
2 Closely related to this is the real wage puzzle: the real wage is not counter-cyclical, as predicted by Keynes, nor 
is it strongly procyclical, as implied by a typical real business cycle model.  Note also that the nominal price 
level appears to be counter-cyclical in most countries (Danthine and Donaldson (1993)). 
3 See Romer (1996) for a thorough discussion of the interaction between real rigidity and nominal frictions in 
models with predetermined prices, adjustment costs etc.   3
interaction between pricing and investment are important determinants of cyclical price 
adjustment. 
  Several authors have pointed to the importance of long-term customer relations. 
Customers attracted by low prices tend to remain loyal and customers lost because of high 
prices are hard to win back. The seminal paper on “customer markets” by Phelps and Winter 
(1970) formalized the idea that firms face a choice between high prices and high profit 
margins today, and low prices, increasing market shares, and high profits in the future.  
Gottfries (1991) and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) showed that if firms in a customer 
market are financially constrained, markups may be counter-cyclical.
4  In a recession, 
companies may be forced to raise prices in order to maintain cash flows and pay their debts; 
in booms they can afford to pursue a more aggressive price policy.  This points to financial 
variables as potentially important determinants of prices. Empirical evidence supporting this 
hypothesis can be found in Bhaskar, Machin and Reid (1993), Chevalier and Scharfstein 
(1996), Gottfries (2001) and Asplund, Eriksson and Strand (2001). 
But if price decisions are dynamic because of customer relations, and firms are 
financially constrained, one would expect to see important interactions between pricing and 
investment decisions. High demand implies high cash flow, but also a need for additional 
capacity.  Large predetermined investment expenditure, which must be financed, should make 
it more likely that firms become financially constrained. The purpose of this paper is to 
explore these interactions theoretically and empirically.
5   
We develop a dynamic model of a firm, which is financially constrained in the 
following sense.  First, it is unable, or unwilling, to issue new shares.  This may be because of 
adverse selection problems, because the owners fear loss of control, or for some other reason.  
Second, lenders are poorly informed and require collateral, so the firm can only borrow an 
amount corresponding to a fraction of its tangible assets. Third, managers or owners dislike 
fluctuations in dividends, and this we capture by assuming that the manager’s objective is a 
concave function of dividends. Finally, we assume that it is sufficiently advantageous to 
borrow that the borrowing constraint is always binding. 
  The firm produces under constant returns to scale using capital and a flexible 
factor, and sells the goods in a “customer market”.  Customers tend to purchase from the same 
firm repeatedly and react slowly to price differentials.  If a firm charges a price below the 
                                                                 
4 A large body of empirical work shows that financial variables, like cash flow, are correlated with investments, 
suggesting imperfections in the capital markets; see the survey by Hubbard (1998). 
5 The present paper builds on, and extends the analysis in Bucht (1997) in several directions.   4
average market price it gradually attracts new customers, and conversely.  Hence the firm has 
two assets: physical production capital, and the customer stock (market share).  The owner 
can invest in real capital - by conventional investment - and in the customer stock - by 
charging a low price to attract new customers.   
  To model investment it is important to allow for time-to-build - the fact that the 
completion of an investment project is a prolonged process.  The importance of time-to-build 
has been stressed by e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1982).  According to Nickell (1978), the 
whole completion process takes about 23 months, whereas Hall (1977) found evidence that 
investments are completed in 21 months. To capture this in a simple way, we assume that real 
capital investments must be decided one year in advance and that capital becomes productive 
one year after it has been installed.  
  We set up a dynamic optimization model with physical capital and the customer 
stock as state variables, solve it numerically and find optimal decision rules for price and 
investment.  We then simulate the model and show that the model generates sluggish price 
adjustment after an unexpected permanent shock to demand. Because of time-to-build, 
investment is predetermined, so when demand falls, the firm finds itself in a financial 
squeeze.  In order to finance investments and avoid drastic cuts in dividends, the firm will 
keep the price approximately unchanged.  In subsequent periods, investment falls, and the 
firm becomes less financially constrained and cuts its price to increase its market share.  
  Four implications of the model are particularly noteworthy.  First, there is a 
form of lagged price adjustment after the demand shock.  Second, the markup over marginal 
cost is counter-cyclical. Third, and contrary to demand, a wage increase has an immediate 
effect on the price.  Fourth, there is a strong effect of investment on the price because, high 
predetermined investment makes the firm more financially constrained. 
  To explore whether the aggregate dynamics of prices and investment are broadly 
consistent with the model, we estimate the decision rules for price and investment on 
aggregate data for the Swedish manufacturing industry 1960-1996. We find qualitative 
support for several of the predictions of the model, though the magnitudes of some 
coefficients differ from what we find in the simulations.  The effect of investment on the price 
is particularly significant and quantitatively important. 
In Section 2 we motivate our specification of the financial constraints. We set up 
the model in Section 3 and present the numerical solution in Section 4.  The data and 
empirical results are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 shows some sensitivity analysis.  
Section 7 concludes.   5
 
 
2.  Financial Constraints 
Figure 1, shows the change in total assets, change in total (short and long-term) debt, new 
share issues, and dividends of Swedish manufacturing (SNI 3).
6  All variables are nominal 
accounting values relative to total assets in the previous year.  We see that borrowing is 
closely correlated with the change in assets and that new share issues play a modest role.  
Dividends have increased over time, but they are much more stable than asset investment and 
borrowing.  Neither share issues nor dividends seem to vary systematically with investment. 
  To introduce financial constraints in a way that is broadly consistent with these 
observations, we make four assumptions: 
i)  The firm does not issue shares.  This may be because of adverse selection problems, 
because owners or managers fear loss of control, or for some other reason.
7   
ii)  Potential lenders know very little about the earnings capacity of the firm and therefore 
require tangible assets as collateral in order to lend to the firm.  We assume that 
borrowing can be used to finance a fixed fraction of the capital stock.  
iii)  Owners or managers dislike fluctuations in dividends.  To capture this, we assume that 
the manager maximizes discounted present value of utility, where utility in one period 
is a concave function of dividends.  In a small entrepreneurial firm, the 
owner/manager may have all his capital invested in the firm and live on the dividends, 
so his preference for smooth consumption translates into a preference for smooth 
dividends.  More generally, it seems clear that firms dislike fluctuations in dividends, 
maybe because dividends are used to signal long-term profitability to shareholders.   
iv)  To make the financial constraints binding, we assume that the discount rate used to 
discount the utility of dividends is sufficiently high relative to the borrowing rate that 
the firm will always borrow as much as possible. This specification is made to 
highlight the role of financial constraints.  The tax advantages of debt are an obvious 
reason why firms may find it advantageous to borrow as much as possible. 
  This specification of financial constraints is obviously very stylized.  Effectively, 
the firm’s capital structure is exogenously given. To explain the evolution of the capital 
                                                                 
6 This data is not used for the estimation below.  Note that total assets include inventories and financial assets, 
which are omitted in the theory and the empirical analysis below.   
7 The adverse selection (lemons) problem arises if existing owners have inside information since they will tend 
to sell off shares exactly when the firm is overvalued in the stock market. Such adverse selection problems can 
lead to breakdown of the market for new shares.   6
structure is a very difficult task, however, which is beyond the scope of the present paper.  
Firms in our model do not have any financial assets.  But if, realistically, the return on 
financial assets is lower than the borrowing rate, it cannot be rational to hold financial assets 
unless they yield some additional benefits.  It would be straightforward to add a liquidity 
demand for financial assets in our model.
8   
  Our assumptions imply that the borrowing constraint is always binding.  In reality, 
we would expect some firms to be financially constrained, and some not.  Also, firms may be 
financially constrained in bad times and unconstrained in good times.
9  This would make the 
analysis substantially more complicated, and weaken the results.  The important implication 
of our specification is that, at any point in time, the shadow price of capital increases if 
investment is higher and decreases if profits increase. 
 
 
3.  The Model 
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where  t D  is real dividends.  The larger is g , the more the manager/owner dislikes 
fluctuations in dividends.
10  The firms’ customer stock is  t X  and each customer buys  t Y  
units, so production is 
 
t t t Y X Q = .    (2) 
 
Because of imperfect information and/or switching costs, the customer stock changes slowly.  
It increases or decreases over time depending on the price charged by the firm, Pt relative to 




                                                                 
8 For example, we could assume that the return on financial assets is lower than the borrowing rate and that 
holdings of liquid assets are proportional to sales.  In practice, there has been a strong trend increase in financial 
assets relative to total assets, probably due to the development of new financial instruments, formation of 
concerns, cross ownership etc.  
9 If a sufficiently good shock occurs in our model, firms will pay back debt and reduce borrowing below the 
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Note that e  is the within-period price elasticity, at the point where 
0 P P = . The production 
function takes the CES form in capital and a flexible production factor  F : 
 
( )( ) [ ]r r r a a
1
1 1 - + - = t t t t K F A Q    ;  . 1 0 < <a   (4) 
 
Real dividends,  t D , are equal to revenue minus the cost of the flexible production 
factor minus the fraction of investment that is financed by retained earnings minus 
depreciation and interest payments, deflated by the relevant consumer price index, 
c
t P : 
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where Wt is the price of the flexible factor, 
k
t P  is the price of capital goods, and q  is the 
fraction of investment which is financed by borrowing. To simplify the model, we take the 
prices of consumption and capital goods to be equal to the market price,
0
t P . Using (2), (3) and 
(4) we may then write   
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The relevant real rate of interest, r, is taken to be constant.  
Time to build is captured by assuming that in period t, the capital stock is 
predetermined, and the firm decides about the capital stock in the coming period.  The 
following Euler equations characterize the optimal plan in period t  
( ) ,... , , ,..., , , 3 2 1 2 1 + + + + + t t t t t t K K K X X X : 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 The real world is characterized by uncertainty, and uncertainty may affect decisions as in the case of 
precautionary saving.  This we neglect: we assume that firms act as if they knew the future with certainty. 
11 For theoretical derivations of such an equation, see e. g. Phelps and Winter (1970), Gottfries (1986, 1991).   8
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The first Euler equation (7) reflects the optimal choice of customer stock.  The second term is 
positive because next period’s profits increase if the firm comes into that period with a larger 
customer stock.  Hence, the first term must always be negative in optimum; because 
customers are valuable, the price is always lower than the price that maximizes current 
profits.  The second Euler equation (8) reflects the optimal investment plan for period t+1 
onwards.  On the margin, the fraction of investment expenditure, which is not debt-financed, 
is taken out of dividends, and this reduces utility in the period when the investment is carried 
out.  Next period, the increase in the capital stock reduces costs, investment can be reduced, 
and the associated debt must be paid back with interest. 
 
 
4.  Numerical Solution of the Model 
The model is too complicated to solve analytically so we solve it numerically.  Because of 
constant returns to scale, we can write the Euler equations in terms of the ratios  t t t K Q Z / =  
and 1 / - t t K K  and the model has a steady state where these ratios are constant.  We solve the 
model by log-linearizing the Euler equations around the steady state and picking the stable 
solution to the resulting system of linear difference equations.  We assume that demand is 
expected to be constant and that if 
0 / t t t P A W  deviates from its steady state value, it is expected 
to return gradually to the steady state value according to:   9
 
( ) ,... 1 , ;
0 0
1 1 1 + = - - = - - + + + t t p a w p a w w t r t t t t t t ,  (9) 
 
where  1 0 < < w r .  Here and below lower case letters denote logs and constant terms are left 
out. In Appendix 1 we derive a closed-form log-linear solution for the optimal price in period 
t and planned investment in period t+1:  
     
( ) ( ) t py t t t pw t pk t t pz t t y a p a w a k a k q a p p D + - - + D + - = - - -
0
1 1
0 ,   (10) 
 
( ) ( ) t ky t t t kw t kk t t kz t y a p a w a k a k q a k D + - - + D + - = D - - +
0
1 1 1 ,  (11) 
 
where the coefficients are complicated functions of the underlying parameters in the model.   
  In our baseline simulation, we take the period to be one year, and we set the 
parameter values as follows:   
 
5 , 7 . , 5 . , 08 . , 92 . , 04 . , 8 . , 19 . , 0 = = = = = = = = = g r q d b e a r w r .  (12) 
 
Economic theory and other information suggest a plausible range for most of these 
parameters.  The parameter r is set to zero so that the elasticity of substitution between the 
factors of production is one (Cobb-Douglas case), which is consistent with long run stability 
of the labor share.  As usual, a should be equal to the capital share in total costs, which is 19 
percent.  The depreciation rate d  is calculated assuming that the depreciation rate for 
machines is 12.3 percent and the depreciaiton rate for buildings is 3.6 percent, and that about 
half the capital stock consists of machines.  The within-year price elasticity of demand e, is 
calculated using estimates in Gottfries (2001).  The real interest rate on debt is set to four 
percent and the owner is assumed to be more impatient, having a discount rate equal to 8 
percent. One reason why the required return on equity is higher is the higher taxation of 
dividends relative to interest payments.  The parameter q is set to one half because, according 
to accounting data, net debt has been around 50 percent of the total real capital stock for   10 
Swedish industry.
12  It is less clear what value we should chose for g , but in line with the 
observation that dividends are very smooth, we chose a relatively large value for g. 
The steady state value of 
0
t t t p a w - -  determines whether the firm is growing or 
declining in the steady state.  We set it in such a way that the firm is not growing in the steady 
state. With these parameter values, we get the following log-linear decision rules:  
   
    ( ) ( ) t t t t t t t t t y p a w k k q p p D + - - + D + - = - - - 01 . 0 62 . 0 63 . 0 01 . 0
0
1 1
0 ,   (13) 
 
    ( ) ( ) t t t t t t t t y p a w k k q k D + - - - D - - = D - - + 37 . 0 17 . 0 57 . 0 37 . 0
0
1 1 1   (14) 
 
By construction, the coefficient on the lagged customer stock (market share) and the 
coefficient on the change in demand are equal in both equations; it does not matter for the 
firm whether it has more customers or each customer buys a larger quantity.  In the price 
equation, this coefficient is small.  The customer stock/demand has a very small effect on the 
price, while the effects of investment and costs are substantial.  In the investment equation, 
the “accelerator effect” of demand is substantial, high investment in the previous period 
reduces the need to invest today, and higher wage costs have  a small negative effect on 
investment. 
Figure 2, panel A, illustrates the simulated effect of a 10 percent, unexpected 
permanent decrease in demand per customer.  Initially, with investment predetermined, the 
firm finds itself in a financial squeeze.  To finance predetermined investments, and avoid 
drastic cuts in dividends the price is kept approximately unchanged. In the subsequent period, 
investment is reduced, and the firm is less financially constrained, so it can afford to cut its 
price to increase the market share.  Thus, the price does not fall immediately, but there is a 
form of lagged price adjustment after the demand shock.  An important implication of the 
model is that high investment makes the firm more financially constrained, so it sets a higher 
price.  Panel B shows the effect of a demand shock using estimated decision rules; these are 
discussed in the next section.   
Panel C shows the effect of the demand shock on the markup. Since output 
increases, the short run marginal cost curve is upward sloping, and the price initially does not 
change much, the markup on marginal cost increases substantially in the recession.  
                                                                 
12 Net debt is calculated as all debt minus financial assets, excluding shares in related companies.  Here, capital 
includes machines, buildings and inventories.  Source: Företagen, SCB.   11 
In Figure 3 we illustrate the effect of a 10 percent increase in the price of the 
flexible factor.  As discussed above, the shock is assumed to be persistent but not permanent. 
Contrary to the case of a demand shock, the effect is immediate, and the price moves more or 
less in line with the input price, but with less than full “pass-through” of costs into prices.
 13   
The predicted response to a cost shock is similar to what we get in a static model. The effect 
on investment is relatively small.  To understand this, note that higher wage cost means higher 
prices and lower sales, but also substitution away from labor to capital; the net result is a 
small negative effect on investment. 
The financial constraints are very important for these results.  To illustrate this, 
consider the case of an owner who has perfect access to the credit market and therefore no 
desire for smooth dividends.  Setting g  close to zero and keeping the other parameters 
constant we get the price and investment policy that maximizes the present value of 
dividends.  This policy is shown in Column 2 of Table 1, and the effect of a permanent 
demand shock is illustrated in Figure 4.  In this case, a demand shock has an immediate and 
large positive effect on the price - as in a static model.  Furthermore, there is no longer any 
positive relation between investment and prices. 
Another interesting issue concerns the slope of the short run marginal cost curve.  
One may argue that a Cobb-Douglas production function, with a unit elasticity of  substitution 
between capital and labor, implies an implausibly large short-run substitutability, and hence a 
too flat marginal cost curve when the capital stock is predetermined.
14  To examine the effect 
of lower substitutability we set  1 - = r , implying an elasticity of substitution equal to one 
half.  As we see from Column 3, the solutions for the optimal price and investment are similar 
to the baseline case.  Although the short-run marginal cost curve is steeper, the effect of 
demand on the price is still very small.  The contercyclical markup dominates even if we 
increase the slope of the marginal cost curve.  The most important difference is that demand 
now has a stronger effect on subsequent investment because it is more important for the firm 
to have the right factor mix.  Also, investment now has a smaller effect on the price.  High 
future capacity makes it more desirable to attract customers – mitigating the effect of the 
financial constraint.  
Experiments with alternative values for the other parameters show that the 
qualitative results that we found in the baseline case are quite robust (Table 2, columns 4-6).   
                                                                 
13 So far, we have not allowed for predetermined prices. 
14 On the other hand, one may argue that less than full utilization of factors has the opposite effect – see 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for a thorough discussion of this.   12 
To sum up, financial constraints do affect the solution in a significant way, but the qualitative 
implications of the model are robust with respect to modest changes in the other parameters.  
The decision rules were derived assuming that the financial constraint always 
binds.  As long as the constraint binds, behavior will be symmetric for negative and positive 
shocks.  But a sufficiently large positive demand shock can put the firm in a position where it 
finds it more advantageous to save financially than to cut the price further to compete for 
market shares.  In such a situation it will pay off debt and borrow less than the feasible 
amount.  For the parameter values used in the baseline simulation this occurs if the 
unexpected positive demand shock is larger than 25 percent.
15   
 
 
5.  Estimates of Decision Rules for Swedish Manufacturing Industry 
In order to see whether the model can capture the broad features of aggregate time series data, 
we estimate the price equation and the investment equation on yearly data for the Swedish 
manufacturing industry 1960-1996. We use yearly data because quarterly data is not available 
for the 1960s and because a one-year implementation lag for investment is plausible and 
incorporating time to build in a quarterly model would be much more complicated. Our output 
measure is gross output and the price is the producer price index.  The capital stock is 
computed from investment data by the perpetual inventory method.  Factor productivity is 
calculated by the Solow method.  A detailed description of the data is found in Appendix 2.   
We think of the behavioral equations as applying to the representative Swedish 
firm.  When going from the representative firm to the aggregate level we have to take account 
of two problems.  First, Swedish firms sell their products in both foreign and domestic 
markets, and the representative Swedish firm competes with other Swedish firms, particularly  
in the domestic market.  Second, a large fraction of costs are costs of intermediate goods 
produced by other Swedish firms.  Therefore, the market price, 
0
t p , and the relevant cost 
index,  t w , both consist to a considerable extent of Swedish prices, i. e. one of the dependent 
variables.
16  Formally, this serious simultaneity problem can be dealt with by appropriate 
choice of instruments, but since we do not have very much data, we chose not to rely on 
asymptotic properties more than necessary.  We therefore solve the model for the price as a 
function of relatively exogenous variables.  To do this, we assume that the firm sets the same 
                                                                 
15 Clearly, the size of the required shock depends on the difference in the required return between debt and 
equity. 
16 This problem is emphasized by Basu (2000).   13 
price in all markets, i. e. we ignore pricing to market,
17 and we define the (average market) 
price as: 
 




t t t p s vp p v s p - + + - = 1 1
0 ,      (16) 
 
where s is the share of output going to the domestic market in 1980,  v is the share of imports 
in domestic “apparent consumption” (production plus imports minus exports) in 1980, 
i
t p  is 
the import price, and 
f
t p  is a competition-weighted sum of foreign producer prices.  Further, 
we assume that the flexible factor F is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of labor L, imported inputs 
I, and domestic inputs M: 
 
2 1 2 1 1 l l l l
t t t t M I L F
- - =  .        (17) 
 
Denoting the wage cost per hour 
l
t w , taking the price of domestic inputs to be the same as the 
output price, and the price of imported inputs to be the import price,
i
t p , we can write the 




t t t p p w w 2 1 2 1 1 l l l l - + - - =
l ,      (18) 
 
where the weights are equal to the cost shares.  Substituting (16) and (18) into the price 
equation (10), we can solve for the price relative to the foreign price level: 
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17 Allowing explicitly for two markets, we would have both market shares as state variables.  While interesting, 
such an extension is beyond the scope of this paper.   14 
Setting the weights  2 1,l l equal to the cost shares, calculated from the input-output matrix, we 
can recover the parameters in the original price equation by nonlinear estimation of equation 
(19).   
The demand index, yt, is constructed analogously as a weighted sum of foreign 
and domestic demand indices: 
 








t y  is domestic “gross apparent consumption” (gross production plus imports minus 
exports), and 
f
t y  is a trade-weighted index of foreign market demand (industrial production). 
The investment equation was estimated as it stands, using the instruments listed 
below.  We included trend and trend squared in the equations to pick up missing trend factors, 
such as changes in product mix, emergence of new competition, unobserved costs etc.  There 
are good reasons to expect some serial correlation in the errors.  First, the omitted shocks may 
themselves be serially correlated.  Second, measurement errors and predetermined prices will 
lead to a moving average structure in the errors.
18  We therefore estimate the equations by 
GMM allowing for first order moving average errors. In the baseline specification we use the 
following instruments:  1 1 1 1 1 2 , , , , , , , - - - - - - D - D D - t t
f
t t t t t t
f
t t y a p w k z y a p w
l l  constant, trend, and 
trend squared.  
The data is illustrated in Figures 5-7.  Figure 5 shows the factor price and the 
output price relative to the market price.  The factor price appears to be an important 
determinant of the relative price, but the price varies less than the factor price relative to the 
foreign price; firms take account of foreign competitors’ prices when they set prices.  The 
diagram also shows investment, and we see that periods of high investment appear to be 
associated with high prices.  Figure 6 shows that output movements are primarily driven by 
demand, though we also see some loss of market share in periods when costs were high 
(1975-76 and late 1980s) and gains of market shares after the currency had depreciated in 
1982 and 1992.
19  Figure 7 illustrates the “accelerator effect” on investment; we note a lag of 
about one-year between peaks in output and peaks in investment.  
                                                                 
18 An i. i. d. measurement error for Y t, for example, will imply that the measurement error for its growth rate is a 
moving average error of the first order.  
19 See Gottfries (2001) for a closer analysis of relative prices and market shares for exports.   15 
The results of estimation are reported in Table 2.  For comparison, we report the 
simulated coefficients for the baseline case in Column 1.  Our purpose here is not to make a 
formal statistical test of the model, but to see whether the qualitative predictions of the model 
are confirmed.  In fact, most qualitative results are in line with the predictions of the model. In 
the price equation, costs and investment have very significant effects of the expected 
magnitude.  The coefficients for the demand variables are small and not significantly different 
from zero.  In the investment equation, the accelerator effect of demand variables is very 
clear, though somewhat smaller than the model predicts.  One reason may be that we have 
neglected adjustment costs in the theoretical model.  Costs have the expected negative effect 
on investment.  The main failure is that we cannot replicate the negative effect of lagged 
investment on current investment.  Again, this may be due to our negligence of adjustment 
costs, or because of omitted variables that affect investment and which are themselves serially 
correlated.  
The similarity between the theoretical and the estimated model is illustrated in 
panels 1B and 2B, showing the effects of shocks with estimated decision rules.  The sluggish 
price response to the demand shock and a close correlation between investment and price is 
evident in both cases. 
 
 
6.  Sensitivity of Estimates 
In Table 2 we report some alternative estimates to check the sensitivity of our results with 
respect to changes in the specification.  These alternative estimates address the following 
concerns: predetermined prices, variations in factor utilization, reverse causality between 
investment and prices, and alternative specification of the trend.   
Predetermined prices: So far we have disregarded predetermined prices.  We did 
this to keep the model clean and avoid confusing the mechanisms discussed here with 
conventional nominal price rigidity.  However, there are several reasons to allow for prices 
being set in advance.  First, there is considerable survey evidence that prices are changed 
infrequently and a correctly specified econometric model should take account of this.
20  
Second, predetermined prices is an alternative, or complementary, explanation of counter-
cyclical markups.  If monopolistic firms adjust their prices infrequently, an unexpected 
negative demand shock will imply unexpectedly low production, low marginal cost, and high 
                                                                 
20 According to Assarsson (1989) and Blinder et al (1998), the frequency of price adjustments is typically once 
or twice per year.   16 
markup.
 21  Third, one may suspect that the statistical correlation between investment and 
prices arises because both variables respond slowly to demand shocks.  If both the capital 
stock and the price are chosen one period in advance, a simultaneous decrease in the price and 
the capital stock may just reflect decreasing demand in the previous period.
22   
One way to allow for predetermined prices is to assume that firms try to 
implement the decision rules above, but they have to set prices for period t based on 
information available in period t-1.  Under rational expectations, we may then estimate the 
decision rules using only lagged variables as instruments.  In Table 2 column 3, we show the 
result when   t t
f
t t y a p w D - , ,
l  are replaced by  2 2 2 2 , , - - - - D - t t
f
t t y a p w
l  in the list of instruments. 
The results are qualitatively similar to the baseline specification. 
A more direct way to test whether the correlation between investment and prices 
arises because both react with a lag to demand is to simply add a lagged demand variable on 
the right hand side of the price equation (and use the original set of instruments).  If the 
correlation between investment and price is spurious for the reason explained above, we 
would expect lagged demand to come in significantly, and the effect of investment on the 
price to disappear.  As we see in Table 2, column 4, lagged demand does not have a 
significant effect on the price, and the effect of investment on the price remains large. 
  Factor utilization: We have used total factor productivity (the Solow residual) as 
measure of technology changes.  The Solow residual is clearly procyclical and there is 
considerable evidence that this is partly due to variations in factor utilization.
23  One way to 
eliminate this measurement error from our technology measure is to use a smoothed measure 
of factor productivity instead of actual factor productivity.  We do this in a simple way by 
regressing factor productivity on a constant, trend, trend squared and cubic trend, and using 
the fitted values instead of  t a .
24  As can be seen in Table 2, column 5, the coefficients for the 
demand variables become even smaller, and this is to be expected since our measure of   t a  is 
less procyclical in this case.  The difference is small, however. 
Reverse causality: In our baseline specification we found a strong 
contemporaneous relation between investment and prices.  Under the maintained hypothesis 
that it takes time to build, so investment is predetermined, we interpreted this as a causal 
                                                                 
21 We assume here that markups are sufficiently high that firms always want to satisfy demand ex post.  
22 Note, however, that in such a model, a positive cost shock would imply higher cost and lower investment in 
the subsequent period. 
23 See e. g. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1995) and Basu and Kimball (1997) for U. S. evidence and  
Carlsson (2000) for Swedish evidence.   17 
effect of investment on prices.  A potential objection is that this statistical relation may be due 
to reverse causality.  If, for some unknown reason, firms are able to charge higher prices, 
profitability increases, and there is stronger incentive to invest.  Thus, high prices may cause 
high investment rather than the reverse.
25  Note, however, that if the causality were indeed the 
reverse, then with time-to-build, we would expect investment in period t+1 to depend on the 
price in period t.
26 In order to check this, we included the relative price in the investment 
equation (also adding it as instrument).  As seen in Table 2, column 6, the coefficient for the 
lagged relative price comes out with a negative value.  This is strong evidence against the 
reverse causality interpretation of our results. 
Stochastic trend: Adding deterministic trends may lead to spurious results if the 
trends are stochastic.  We therefore estimated the model after taking first differences on both 
sides of the equations and leaving out the quadratic trend term.
27  The instruments were 
differenced accordingly.  The result is shown in  Table 2, column 7.  Again, the results are 
qualitatively similar to the baseline (level) specification. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
The present paper started off from two well-documented facts.  The first is that the market 
position is an important asset of a typical firm and a relatively high price leads to erosion of 
the market position.  Therefore, firms should care about the long-term consequences of their 
pricing decisions. The second is that financial markets are not perfect. Owners often have 
limited resources.  New equity finance is associated with information problems and loss of 
control and plays a modest role in practice. Borrowing is restricted because few firms have 
access to bond markets, and lenders often require collateral for their borrowing.  
Consequently, it is generally accepted that financial factors matter for investment.  
  But if pricing decisions are effectively dynamic investment decisions and 
financial markets are imperfect, two conclusions are inescapable.  First, financial constraints 
should affect pricing decisions and, second, there should be important interactions between 
physical investment in production capital and price competition for market shares.  On the one 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
24 This approach may produce a better measure of technology if technology is a smooth process, but this is not 
necessarily the case.  Also, it does not address the question why there are variations in factor utilization. 
25 An example is serially correlated measurement errors in 
*
t p .  An unobserved increase in the true 
*
t p  may 
cause both price and investment to rise.  
26 As noted in the introduction, there is considerable evidence that there are implementation lags in investment. 
27 Thus, variables which are already appear in first differenced form in the decision rules now appear as second 
order differences.   18 
hand, the two stocks are complements: a higher capacity is more valuable if one has a high 
market share, and conversely.  On the other hand, they compete for available financial 
resources at a given point in time; charging a low price, to penetrate the market, is costly, and 
so is physical investment. 
  We have shown that a model that allows for these realistic features can explain 
several of the puzzles relating to price dynamics.  Prices are found to respond slowly to 
demand shocks, but immediately to cost shocks, and the markup is strongly counter-cyclical.  
An implication of the model is that price should depend strongly on investment, and we find 
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Appendix 1:  Derivation of the closed-form solution 
Multiplying the first Euler equation by  t
g
t Y K / 1 -  we may write it in terms of the 
ratios , / , / , / 1 1 - - t t t t t t t Y Y K K K Y X  and  ) /(
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Multiplying the second Euler equation by 
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Define  ( ) t t t t K Y X z / ln = , ( ) 1 / ln - = D t t t K K k ,  ( ) 1 / ln - = D t t t Y Y y  and  ( ) ) /( ln ˆ
0
t t t t P A W w = .  We 
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  (A6) 
 
Labor cost determines whether the firm shrinks or grows in steady state. We choose the 
steady state value of  W ˆ  so that the firm neither grows nor shrinks in steady state ( ) 0 = Dk .  
Linearizing around the stationary solution and leaving out the constant term we get:  
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 9 8 1 7 6 1 5 4 1
2
3 2 1
1 1 1 1 1
ˆ
, , ˆ , ˆ , , , , , 0
+ + + +
+ + + - +
D + + + + D + + + +
» D D D D =
t t t t
t t t t t t t t t
y L f f w L f f k L f f z L f L f f
y y w w k k z z z f
     (A7) 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 9 8 1 7 6 1 5 4 1
2
3 2 1
1 1 1 1 1
) ( ˆ
, , ˆ , ˆ , , , , , 0
+ + + +
+ + + - +
D + + + + D + + + +
» D D D D =
t t t t
t t t t t t t t t
y L g g w L g g k L g g z L g L g g
y y w w k k z z z g
      (A8) 
   23 
where L is the lag operator and the coefficients are the derivatives of a and b evaluated at the 
steady state.  We assume that shocks to demand are perceived as permanent while cost shocks 
are expected to be reversed in the future: 
 
,... 2 , 1 , 1 0 ; ˆ ˆ
,... 3 , 2 , 1 , 0
1 + + = < < =
+ + + = = D
- t t w w





   (A9) 
 
Consider now periods  ,... 2 , 1 + + = t t t  for which  0 = D t y .  Multiply (A7) by  ( ) L g g 5 4 +  and 
(A8) by  ( ) L f f 5 4 +  and eliminate the terms involving  k D : 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) [ ]
( )( ) ( )( ) [ ] 1 5 4 7 6 7 6 5 4
1
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+ + - + + =
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t
t
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Using (A9) and collecting terms in the polynomial on the left hand side we can write:  
 
( ) 1 1




1 4 4 1 g f g f A - =            2 4 1 5 4 2 5 1 g f g f g f g f B - - + =  
 
3 4 2 5 4 3 5 2 g f g f g f g f C - - + =       3 5 5 3 g f g f D - =  
 
( ) ( ) 5 7 7 5 4 7 5 6 6 5 7 4
2
4 6 6 4 g f g f g f g f g f g f g f g f H - + - - + + - = f f .   
 
Dividing by A and factorizing the polynomial we get  
 
( )( )( ) 1 1 3 2 1 ˆ 1 1 1 - + = - - - t t l l l w
A
H
z L L L      (A12) 
 
where    24 
A
B
- = + + 3 2 1 l l l ,      
A
C
= + + 3 2 3 1 2 1 l l l l l l ,            
A
D
- = 3 2 1 l l l . 
 
This equation system can be solved for the unknown reciprocals of the roots  3 1 l l - .  We find 
one that is smaller than unity and denoting this root  1 l , we can solve for the stable solution as 
in Sargent (1979, p179):  
 




f l f l
l l
l l
























j j j j
j j



























































































  (A13) 
 
and hence we have the solution for  1 + t z : 
 








2 3 3 2









+ = + .  (A14) 
 
Solving analoguously for  t k D  we get: 
 
( )( )( ) 2 1 3 2 1 ˆ 1 1 1 - + = D - - - t t l l l w
A
M
k L L L   (A15) 
 
where the roots are the same as above and 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 7 3 3 7 6 3 7 2 3 6 2 7
2
6 2 7 1 1 7 2 6
3
6 1 1 6 g f g f g f g f g f g f g f g f g f g f g f g f M - + - - + + - - + + - = f f f
 
and thus 
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+ D = D t t t l f l f l l
l w
A M
k k .  (A16) 
 
These solutions hold for t=t+1 and onwards, but not necessarily for t=t-1, t.  To find the 
solution for period t we use the linearized Euler equations for periods t and t+1 for z, and that 
for t+1 for k (since k is set one period in advance) and solve these 5 equations.  The result is 
an approximate closed form solution: 
 
t zy t zw t zk t zz t y a w a k a z a z D + + D + = -1   (A17)  
 
. ˆ 1 1 t ky t kw t kk t kz t y a w a k a z a k D + + D + = D - +   (A18) 
 
(Note that  t y D  is normally not equal to zero.)  To find the solution for the price we use a 
Taylor expansion of the inverted customer flow equation:  
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Appendix 2: Data  
 
All variables are in fixed prices and are mainly collected from the National Accounts. 
 
Capital stock (K) 







t I K K + - = -1 1 d ,  buildings machinery i , =  
 
where the depreciation rate is 12.3 and 3.6 percent per year for machinery and buildings 





t t K K K + =  
 
Output (Q) 
The output measure is gross output. 
 
Total market demand  ( ) Y  
The foreign demand component is the sum of the volume indexes of industrial production in 
the OECD countries, weighted with the export shares. Domestic demand is measured by 
apparent consumption: Swedish gross production (Q) plus imports minus exports. Total 
market demand is then the sum of the two parts, weighted with the share of output going to 





t t Y Y Y 35 . 0 65 . 0 + =  
 
 
Domestic inputs (M) 
Intermediate consumption at purchaser prices 
 
Factor productivity (A) 
The factor productivity is calculated as: 
36 . 0 45 . 0 19 . 0
t t t
t
t L M K
Q
A =  
 
The weights are the arithmetical averages for the factor shares in gross output using micro 
data from Enterprises, Financial Accounts collected by Statistics Sweden. The capital share is 
calculated as value added less total wage costs divided by total sales. 
 
Producer price (P) 









t t P P P 35 . 0 65 . 0




t P  is the domestic price index (1990=100) and 
F
t P  the foreign producer price index. 
D
t P  is the weighted sum of P and the import price index (0.75P+0.25PI), where the weights 
are determined by the share of imports in domestic apparent consumption. 
 
F
t P  is the sum of foreign
28 producer price indexes, using competition weights
29. The producer 
price indexes recalculated to Swedish kronor and normalized to 1990=100. 
 
 
Effective relative wage ( ) W ˆ  
The effective relative wage is the hourly wage including employers’ contribution to social 
security divided by the product of factor productivity and the competitive price. 
 
 
                                                                 
28 USA, Canada, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
29 Shares from OECD Main Aggregates Vol 1.   28 
 
Table 1. Simulated Price and Investment Equations 
 






01 . 0 = g   1 - = r   1 = e   94 . 0 = b   7 . 0 = q  
Price equation             
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Table 2. Estimated Price and Investment Equations 
 




















t t p p -  
             
1 1 - - - t t k q  
 
 0.01    0.0434 
 (0.0662) 
  0.0133 
 (0.0625) 




   -0.0358 
 (0.1353) 
t k D  
 
 0.63    0.8622 
 (0.2343) 
  0.9305 
 (0.2674) 
  0.7661 
 (0.2437) 
  0.7965 
 (0.2876) 
    1.2527 
 (0.4563) 
0
t t t p a w - -  
 
 0.62    0.4201 
 (0.0471) 
  0.3833 
 (0.0691) 
  0.4448 
 (0.0588) 
  0.4851 
 (0.0551) 
    0.4887 
 (0.0681) 
t y D  
 
 0.01    0.0832 
 (0.0471) 
  0.0097 
 (0.1248) 




    0.1051 
 (0.0637) 
1 - D t y  
 
        0.0618 
 (0.0696) 
     
p-value      0.329    0.495    0.211    0.816      0.480 
2 R       0.926    0.919    0.932    0.914      0.837 
Investment 
equation 
1 + D t k  
             
1 1 - - - t t k q  
 
 0.37    0.1715 
 (0.0480) 
      0.1826 
 (0.0572) 
  0.2109 
 (0.0549) 
  0.0553 
 (0.1221) 
t k D  
 
-0.57   -0.0826 
 (0.1490) 
     -0.0536 
 (0.2169) 
  0.0682 
 (0.1572) 
  0.1112 
 (0.3733) 
0
t t t p a w - -  
 
-0.17   -0.0917 
 (0.0248) 
     -0.0876 
 (0.0321) 




t y D  
 
 0.37    0.2395 
 (0.0398) 
      0.2598 
 (0.0442) 
  0.2771 
 (0.0492) 
  0.1456 
 (0.0449) 
0
t t p p -  
 
           -0.2805 
 (0.1373) 
 
p-value            0.453    0.364    0.291 
2 R             0.853    0.863    0.897 
 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are t-values.  All estimations were done by GMM allowing for 
first order moving average and heteroscedasticity. Estimations included a constant, trend and 
trend squared, which are not reported. The next to last row shows the p-value for the test of 
overidentifying restrictions. There were modest signs of autocorrelation in the residuals, but 
only the first lag in the investment equation was significant.   30 
Figure 1.  Sources of Finance for Swedish Manufacturing 
 
 
Note:  All data in this figure is aggregate nominal accounting data for the manufacturing 
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Figure 2.  The effect of a 10 percent permanent decrease in demand (Ay) in t=1.   
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Note: All panels show log deviations from steady state except for dividends relative to 
capital.   33 
 
 
Figure 3. The effect of a 10 percent increase in the price of the flexible factor (w-a-p
0). 
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Note: All panels show log deviations from steady state.  34 



















Note: The figure shows log deviations from steady state. 
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